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Chapter 1 Introduction
In this chapter, I provide real-world motivation for a team formation model focused
upon hedonic utilities for roles and compositions of roles within teams. I introduce
this as the role based hedonic game (RBHG) model, which is formally defined in
Section 2.2.
I detail motivations in massively multiplayer online games (MMOs), urban and
planetary robot exploration, and modular robot teams in Section 1.1. Following in
Section 1.2, I describe the stabilization and optimization goals of matchmaking in the
RBHG setting and give a brief overview of the results provided in this dissertation.
I provide an outline of the remaining chapters in Section 1.3.
1.1 A Massively Multiplayer Motivation
In coalition formation games, agents from a population have various utilities for
different partitions. Hedonic coalition formation games are a sub-class in which agents
have utilities for their own teams and not others. In this dissertation, I consider the
variant Role Based Hedonic Games (RBHGs) [68]. In this model, an agent’s utility
for a partition is based upon the role it fulfills on its team and the roles fulfilled by
its teammates. The multiset of roles fulfilled by a team is termed its composition.
Team formation includes forming a partition of agents to teams and matching agents
to roles within their teams.
This work is motivated by team formation in massively multiplayer online games.
World of Warcraft [34], League of Legends [44], Defense of the Ancients 2 (DoTA 2)
[66], Counter–Strike: Global Offensive [65] and Diablo III [32] are currently the five
most popular online games in the world, taking up over 44% of the share of playing
time according to the February 2015 report by Raptr [58].
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While these games vary highly in play style, each incorporates some variation of
role based team formation. Players may fulfill different roles within teams depending
upon play styles, goals and personal preferences. Roles within a team may be defined
loosely, as is the case with Counter-Strike, or more strictly as with multiplayer online
battle arenas (MOBAs) such as League of Legends and DoTA 2. In a typical MOBA,
players join a queue and are partitioned into teams of a fixed size to compete team–
versus–team. Within a team, each player fulfills a single role such as attacker, defender
or support. Game play involves attacking the enemy team and the enemy “base” until
achieving some victory objective. League of Legends is currently the most popular
game in the MOBA genre and in general, taking up over 21% of the share of playing
time on its own [58]. Other popular entries in the MOBA genre include Heroes of
Newerth [71] and SMITE [45]. The most recent entry into the MOBA lineup is
Heroes of the Storm [33], released by Blizzard Entertainment in June, 2015. With
several major developers investing in this popular genre of video game, I consider the
importance of team formation problems encountered by players in this setting.
Players in these and competitors’ games are interested in forming teams where
individual desires for roles and team compositions are compatible. A Counter-Strike
player who prefers to act as her team’s only sniper might prefer a team with no
others with the same preference. A League of Legends player who prefers to play a
supporting role might want a team with at least one player who needs this support.
It would be valuable for player desires to be more consistently fulfilled, since this
determines enjoyment of the game and the success of the game studio. I am interested
in situations where players have utility over their own role and the composition of
roles in their assigned team.
As additional motivation I consider dynamic heterogeneous team formation for
robotic urban search and rescue and planetary exploration. Gunn and Anderson
observe that “as robots change roles and teams, the overriding goal is to form stable
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teams” and that “adjusting the roles robots fill on the team can occur when a robot
loss or failure is recognized, or when a new robot is encountered and a team merge
and redistribution can occur [40].” Now consider a planetary exploration setting,
where robots designed by a variety of manufacturers, corporations, private citizens
and countries are tasked to work together to accomplish pre-set and not-necessarily-
homogeneous goals. Robots far from home must be able to work effectively in a
dynamic environment with unpredictable weather and other agents with possibly
different goals and motivations [35, 79].
Even when robots share the same utilities for compositions or share the same goal
such as mapping unfamiliar terrain [20], developing conditions may cause changes
in preferences for certain roles and compositions. A robot low on energy may be
qualified to fulfill the role of Driller while working on a short project or when working
with other Driller robots, but may reject compositions requiring more resources than
it can produce at the time. Similarly, a robot designed to fulfill the Driller role
(among others) may have reduced utility for fulfilling this role if its drilling arm is
damaged. Additionally, as objectives are completed on the planetary surface, certain
compositions may have lowered utility for different agents. Agents with high fuel
reserves may have low utility for a composition related to recharging solar fuel cells,
for example. Though these robots are designed to work together, they should be able
to make decisions which optimize productivity for the individual robots involved.
Modular re-configurable robots for planetary exploration have been considered,
with early work by Yim et al. [82], work in cooperative reassembly by Tuci et al. [75],
more recent advancements in modular re-configurable robotic systems by Eckenstein
and Yim [30] and Ahmadzadeh and Masehian [2], and recent hardware developments
such as ModRED, as presented by Baca et al. [11] and Hossain et al. [43]. These
advancements allow for individual robots to change and adopt new roles with re-
configurations made as needed. Underlying utility for a composition could be used
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to determine the value of changing to a new role, possibly at the cost of another role.
1.2 What Makes a Good Solution
Though a central authority might wish to maximize total utility for a partition,
this goal relies upon the agents’ acceptance of the assignment. When agents have
autonomy and hedonic utilities, they can and will choose to make local changes
for improvement. A partition from the central authority should make such changes
unnecessary.
Finding an optimal partition is not a sufficient or worthwhile goal if agents don’t
stick to the plan. In an MMO, players are unlikely to know or care about the global
utility of a partition. They will be more interested in changing the assignment to
improve their own utilities. The players are not a captive audience. Should players
not find partitions to their liking, they may switch to other games or even read books
in the worst case [70]. The MMO industry is highly competitive and the players can
be quite fickle.
In order to improve acceptance of partitions by the population, finding stable
partitions needs to be the focus. While I expect agents to make changes which
gravitate towards a stable partition, it is worthwhile to partition them such that
these changes are easy or unnecessary. If a player is consistently matched to a team
which they find unacceptable, the player may quit the game altogether rather than
have to improve every assignment offered.
Each of these optimization and stability problems is concerned with a scenario
where a central authority would determine both the team assignments of players
within the RBHG population and their role assignments within teams. In online
games such as League of Legends and DoTA 2, the central authority only controls
which teams the players are assigned to. Role assignments are chosen by the players
after teams are formed. It has also been observed that, for some stability measures,
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there may be multiple stable assignments with variable utility levels [69]. A stable
assignment is not guaranteed to have an optimal utility even among stable assign-
ments. For this reason, I ultimately focus attention on optimizing the “local world”
in which a partition will autonomously form its final matching of roles. I call these
optimization goals optimal expected stability and optimal expected utility. In this dis-
sertation, I consider optimization and stability problems for settings with variable
power on the part of the central authority and on the part of the agents.
1.3 Chapter Outline
In Chapter 2, I define the team formation models considered and the optimization
and stability goals I seek to achieve in the RBHG setting. I also show that, given a
partition of agents to teams, the optimal composition utility, expected stability, and
expected utility of matchings for this partition can all be computed in time polynomial
in the size of the input.
Chapter 3 outlines related work in optimization and stability for hedonic coalition
formation games, the use of roles in object-oriented programming, real-world consid-
erations for roles that players fulfill in online games, and team formation for urban
and planetary exploration robots with possibly changing roles.
Chapter 4 provides proofs of computational complexity for several important op-
timization and stability problems in RBHG. When a central authority has full control
over the partition and the matching, I prove that optimization problems concerning
finding perfect, max sum utilitarian, and max min egalitarian solutions are all NP-
hard in RBHG. For cases in which agents may choose to defect from a given partition
and/or matching from the central authority, I prove that finding Nash stable, envy-
free and Nash stable, individually stable, core stable, and strict core stable solutions
are all NP-complete problems, while deciding Pareto optimality or contractual strict
core stability of the grand coalition is coNP-complete.
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Chapter 5 provides two heuristic matchmaking approaches and the results of test-
ing on both synthetic and real world matchmaking data. I introduce greedy voting
and greedy location search heuristic methods for generating RBHG solutions. These
methods are compared with respect to optimal composition utility, expected stability,
and expected utility against optimized matchings on partitions selected uniformly at
random. The methods are validated on real-world data scraped from League of Leg-
ends games and on randomly generated RBHG instances with various methods for
generating role and composition utilities.
Chapter 6 outlines the results of this work and my plans for future work in rec-
ommendation systems for League of Legends and other role based hedonic games.
Copyright c© Matthew Spradling, 2015.
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Chapter 2 Preliminaries
In this chapter, I outline the Roles and Teams Hedonic Game model (RTHG) [69]
in Section 2.1 and the generalized Role Based Hedonic Game model (RBHG) [68] in
Section 2.2. An instance of RTHG is an instance of RBHG where team size is fixed
at an integer m and all possible compositions of that size are considered. The RBHG
model allows more flexibility for varying team sizes and allows some compositions to
be omitted from consideration. RBHG allows for the consideration of more general
settings where certain compositions are not feasible (a sniper team with no snipers)
or generally not well accepted by the population (a MOBA team consisting only of
support champions). Additionally, I outline the Additively Separable Hedonic Game
model (ASHG) [9,16] in Section 2.3. Several stability problems are known to be hard
in ASHG. I perform reductions in Section 4.2 to show that these problems remain
hard for RBHG.
I consider optimal solutions and stable solutions as goals for matchmaking in
these settings. A solution is optimal with respect to some function of agent utilities
if no other solution has a better value for that utility function. Examples include
maximizing average utility of all teams (MaxSum) or maximizing the utility of the
worst-off team in the solution (MaxMin). A solution is stable with respect to some
set of possible movements if no agent, or group of agents, can improve utility by
defecting from the solution within the confines of these allowable moves. I define
several such optimal and stable solution goals in Sections 2.4 and 2.5, and provide
reductions to show hardness for these problems in Section 4.1.
2.1 Roles and Teams Hedonic Games
A Roles and Teams Hedonic Game (RTHG) instance consists of:
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Table 2.1: Example RTHG instance with |P | = 4,m = 2, |R| = 2
〈r, t〉 up0(r, t) up1(r, t) up2(r, t) up3(r, t)
〈A,AA〉 2 2 0 0
〈A,AB〉 0 3 2 2
〈B,AB〉 3 0 3 3
〈B,BB〉 1 1 1 1
• P : A population of players {p1, p2, ...pk} for some integer k.
• m: a team size (I assume that |P |/m is an integer);
• R: A set of roles
• C: A set of compositions, where a composition c ∈ C is a multiset (bag) of
roles from R and |c| = m, and where C contains all size m multisets from R.
For RTHG instances, it is not necessary to take C as a parameter as it may be
generated from m and R.
• U : P ×R×C → Z defines the utility function ui(r, c) for each player pi. Unless
otherwise specified, I assume that for all pi ∈ P and for all r ∈ R, ui(r, {r}) = 0,
representing an agent’s utility for being partitioned to a team by itself. Role
and compositions assignments with a positive utility are seen by the agent as
an improvement for that agent over being partitioned alone, while role and
composition assignments with a negative utility are seen as being worse than
being left alone.
See Table 2.1 for an example RTHG instance. A solution to an RTHG instance
is a partition π of agents into teams of size m and a matching M of agents to roles
in R. I denote π(pi) = t
i as the team (set of agents) to which pi is partitioned and
M(pi) = r
i as the role to which pi is assigned. The composition c
i ∈ C of ti is the
multiset of roles to which agents in ti are matched.
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2.2 Role Based Hedonic Games
A Role Based Hedonic Game (RBHG) instance consists of:
• P : A population of players {p1, p2, ...pk} for some integer k.
• R: A set of roles
• C: A set of compositions, where a composition c ∈ C is a multiset (bag) of
roles from R. For some RBHG instances, C may be taken as a parameter. This
depends upon the form of the utility function.
• U : P ×R×C → Z defines the utility function ui(r, c) for each player pi. Unless
otherwise specified, I assume that for all pi ∈ P and for all r ∈ R, ui(r, {r}) = 0,
representing an agent’s utility for being partitioned to no team at all.
The Roles and Teams Hedonic Game (RTHG) model assumes a fixed team size
m which all teams share and that the set of compositions C includes all possible
multisets of R [69]. In RBHG, there is no fixed team size and the set C need not
include all compositions.
Observe that some compositions may be considered universally unacceptable ei-
ther by the population (a MOBA team of all healers which has little chance of win-
ning) or a central authority (a military commander forming a sniper team with no
snipers). Team size may not have reason to be fixed in real-world scenarios. Even
in MOBA games, where team size is usually fixed for each team, some players may
join a queue as a preformed “buddy group” needing only a few additional players.
A central authority could leverage the RBHG model to find smaller sub-teams to
complete these groups.
A solution to an RBHG instance is a partition π of agents into teams and a
matching M of agents to roles in R. I denote π(pi) = t
i as the team (set of agents)
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to which pi is partitioned and M(pi) = r
i as the role to which pi is assigned. The
composition ci ∈ C of ti is the multiset of roles to which agents in ti are matched.
Because RBHG is a hedonic game, utility of a player pi for a partition π and
matching M is ui(r
i, ci).
2.3 Additively Separable Hedonic Games
An Additively Separable Hedonic Game (ASHG) [9, 16] instance consists of:
• N : A population of players {n1, n2, ...nk} for some integer k.
• V : A vector V of utility functions over all pairs of agents in N , where vi(nj) ∈ V
is an integer representing the utility player ni has for having player nj on its
team. Unless otherwise specified, I assume that vi(ni) = 0 for all ni ∈ N ,
representing an agent’s utility for being partitioned to a team by itself.
A solution to an ASHG instance is a partition π of agents into teams. I denote
π(ni) = t
i as the team (set of agents) to which ni is partitioned.
Because ASHG is a hedonic game, utility of a player for a partition π is equal to
that player’s utility for its team: π(ni) = t
i. Let vi(t) =
∑
j∈t vi(nj) be the utility of
player ni for team t. A player ni’s utility for π is vi(t
i).
Because some researchers [12,16,36] have dealt with special cases of ASHGs, much
of the recent research refers to the definition just given as general ASHGs.
When agents in RTHB, RBHG and ASHG have binary preferences for partitions
which they either will or will not find acceptable, I call these accept–reject cases.
In an accept–reject instance of each game, an agent will accept a partition if it has
positive utility for the assignment and reject the partition otherwise.
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2.4 Optimal Solutions
In this section, I define perfect, MaxSum, and MaxMin solutions for RBHG. I prove
that perfect solutions may not always exist.
Perfect solutions for general hedonic games are defined such that each agent is in
one of her most preferred coalitions [6]. For RBHG, I define a perfect solution to be
one in which each agent gets a most-preferred role and composition pair. Note that,
in the general RBHG model, there may be multiple equivalently-valued compositions
and roles. Therefore these preferences are not necessarily strict.
Definition 2.4.1. Given an instance B of RBHG, a perfect solution (π,M) is a
partition of agents to teams and a matching of agents to roles so that, for each pi ∈ P ,
where M(pi) = r
i and π(pi) = t
i has composition ci, ui(r
i, ci) = max{ui(r′, c′) :
r′ ∈ R ∧ c′ ∈ C}.
A perfect solution is impossible for some RBHG instances. Consider an RBHG
instance where P = {Alice,Bob}. Both Alice and Bob strictly prefer the team
composition of 〈Mage, Assassin〉 with themselves playing the role Assassin to all
other 〈r, c〉 pairs. No perfect partition is possible.
I consider the following notions of utility optimization.
Definition 2.4.2. Given an instance B of RBHG, a MaxSum solution is one that
achieves the maximum value of Σi<|P |ui.
Definition 2.4.3. Given an instance B of RTHG, a MaxMin solution is one that
achieves the maximum value of minpi∈P ui.
2.5 Stable Solutions
The notion of stability of a partition is one in which no agent has incentive to move
from their assigned coalition. Different notions of stability depend on different con-
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straints on agent movements. In this section, I describe the broad notion of stability
in hedonic games. I formally define several RBHG stability problems of the form,
“Given an instance of RBHG, does a stable solution exists?” I compare these to the
related ASHG stability problems and observe known hardness results.
A partition for an RBHG instance is stable when agents have no incentive, or
perceived improvement of utility, for changing their assigned role and team. Changing
involves some sort of movement by the agents.
Any movement begins from a partition π and results in a new partition π′. This
change may be made by individual agents or jointly by a group of agents. A partition
π of a hedonic coalition formation game is stable if, given a set of possible movements,
no agents would improve utility by making such changes.
When I say that a player i moves from a team t to a team t′, I mean that the
partition π containing t and t′ is modified such that t := t − {i} and t′ := t′ ∪ {i}.
This creates a new partition π′ in which i is a member of t′ and not a member of t.
When I say that a team breaks off from a partition I mean that these agents move
from their current teams in the partition and form a new team t′ together. When the
group of agents breaks off, this creates a new partition π′ which includes the team t′.
Individually Rational A partition π is individually rational (IR) iff no player
can benefit by moving from its team ti to a team by itself.
In ASHG, π is individually rational iff all players ni ∈ N have utility vi(ti) ≥ 0.
In RBHG, π is individually rational iff all players pi ∈ P have utility ui(ri, ci) ≥ 0.
Generally, we assume that an agent has utility 0 for being on a team by itself.
Nash Stable A partition π is Nash stable (NS) iff no player pi ∈ P can benefit
by moving from its team ti to another (possibly empty) team t′.
In ASHG, π is Nash stable iff π is individually rational and it holds that for
all ni ∈ N , for all t′ ∈ π, vi(ti) ≥ vi(t′ ∪ {ni}). In RBHG, π is Nash stable iff π
is individually rational and it holds that for all pi ∈ P , for each t′ ∈ π having a
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composition c′, for all r′ ∈ R, ui(ri, ci) ≥ ui(r′, c′ ∪ {r′}).
Observation 2.5.1. [73] Checking whether an NS partition exists in an ASHG is
NP-hard.
Individually Stable A partition π is individually stable (IS) iff no player pi ∈ P
can benefit by moving from its team ti to another (possibly empty) team t′ while not
making members of t′ worse off.
In ASHG, π is individually stable iff π is individually rational and it holds that
for all ni ∈ N , for all t ∈ π, if vi(ti) < vi(t ∪ {ni}) then vj(t) > vj(t ∪ {ni}) for some
j ∈ t. In RBHG, π is individually stable iff π is individually rational and it holds
that for all pi ∈ P , for all t ∈ π, for all r′ ∈ R, if ui(ri, ci) < ui(r′, c ∪ {r′}) then
uj(r
j, c) > uj(r
j, c ∪ {r′}) for some j ∈ t.
Observation 2.5.2. [73] Checking whether an IS partition exists in an ASHG is
NP-hard.
Core Stable A team t′ blocks a partition π if each player i ∈ t′ has greater utility
for t′ than its current team ti ∈ π. A partition π which admits no blocking coalition
is said to be in the core or core stable (CS). If the core is empty, this means that
there are no core stable partitions.
In ASHG, a team t′ blocks a partition π iff there is a set N ′ ⊆ N where t′ is a
team consisting of all agents in N ′ and vi(t
′) > vi(t
i) for all ni ∈ N ′. In RBHG, a
team t′ having a composition c′ blocks a partition π iff there is a set P ′ ⊆ P and an
assignment of agents in P ′ to the bag of roles c such that ui(r
i, c) > ui(r
i, ci) for all
pi ∈ P ′.
Observation 2.5.3. [9,73] Checking whether a non-empty CS partition exists in an
ASHG is NP-hard.
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Strict Core Stable A team t′ weakly blocks a partition π if each player i ∈ t′
has greater or equal utility for t′ compared to its current team ti ∈ π and at least
one player j ∈ t′ has greater utility for t′ than its current team tj ∈ π. A partition
π which admits no weakly blocking coalition is said to be in the strict core or strict
core stable (SCS). If the strict core is empty, this means that there are no strict core
stable partitions.
In ASHG, a team t′ weakly blocks a partition π iff there is a set N ′ ⊆ N where t′ is
a team consisting of all agents in N ′, vi(t
′) ≥ vi(ti) for all ni ∈ N ′, and vj(t′) > vj(tj)
for at least one nj ∈ N ′. In RBHG, a team t′ having a composition c′ weakly blocks
a partition π iff there is a set P ′ ⊆ P and an assignment of agents in P ′ to the bag
of roles c such that ui(r
i, c) ≥ ui(ri, ci) for all pi ∈ P ′ and uj(rj, c) > uj(rj, cj) for at
least one pj ∈ P ′
Observation 2.5.4. [9, 73] Checking whether a non-empty strictly core stable par-
tition exists in an ASHG is NP-hard.
Contractual Strict Core Stable A partition π is said to be in the contractual
strict core or contractual strict core stable (CSCS) iff any weakly blocking team t′
makes at least one player nj ∈ N\t′ worse off when breaking off.
In ASHG, a player nj ∈ N is worse off when a weakly blocking team t′ breaks off
if some agent ni ∈ t′ was formerly on tj ∈ π and vj(tj − {ni}) < vj(tj). In RBHG,
a player nj ∈ N is worse off when a weakly blocking team t′ breaks off if some agent
pi ∈ t′ was formerly on tj ∈ π in a role ri and uj(rj, cj − {ri}) < uj(rj, cj).
Observation 2.5.5. [9] Verifying whether the partition is contractual strict core
stable in ASHGs is coNP-complete.
Pareto Optimal A partition π is Pareto optimal (PO) iff there is no partition
π′ such that each agent has utility greater than or equal to their utility for π and at
least one agent has greater utility for π′ than for π [9].
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In ASHG, a partition π is Pareto optimal iff there is no partition π′ such that
vi(t
′i) ≥ vi(ti) for all ni ∈ N and vj(t′j) > vj(tj) for at least one nj ∈ N . In
RBHG or RTHG, a partition π is Pareto optimal iff there is no partition π′ such that
ui(r
′i, c′i) ≥ ui(ri, ci) for all pi ∈ P and uj(r′j, c′j) > uj(rj, cj) for at least one pj ∈ P .
Observation 2.5.6. [8, 9] Verifying whether a given partition π is Pareto optimal
in ASHGs is coNP-complete.
Envy Free A partition π is envy free (EF) iff no player has utility for her team
that is less than her utility for another agent’s team.
In ASHG, π is EF iff no player ni ∈ N has utility vi(ti) < Σk∈tjvi(k), for some
player nj ∈ N on team tj ∈ π. In RBHG, π is EF iff no player pi ∈ P has utility
ui(r
i, ci) < ui(r
j, cj), for some player pj ∈ P on team tj ∈ π in role rj.
Observation 2.5.7. [8] Checking whether there exists a partition which is both envy
free and Nash stable in ASHGs is NP-complete even if preferences are symmetric.
2.6 Expected Utility and Stability
Given a partition of agents to a particular team t, the utilities of the agents within
t over the roles within some composition c can be stored in a |t| x |t| matrix. One
such matrix for each of C compositions represents the utilities of the agents of t for
all compositions.
In this section, I define several optimization objectives given a team t. An optimal
utility matching for a team t given a composition c is one for which total utility is
maximized for that team and composition. I define an optimal composition for a team
t as a composition for which optimal utility is maximized. For accept–reject instances
of RBHG, I define a stable composition as one for which there is a matching of agents
to roles which each agent on the team accepts (has a positive utility for).
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I define candidate compositions which may result from a team being matched to
roles given the utilities of its members for roles and compositions. I define reachable
compositions as compositions which can be formed by a team given their preferences
for roles. I define advocated compositions as those compositions for which at least
one agent on the team has a positive utility.
I define the expected utility of a team t as the average optimal utility across a
set of candidate compositions. I additionally define expected stability for accept–reject
instances of RBHG as percentage of candidate compositions which are also stable
compositions. Finally, I define optimal expected utility and optimal expected stability
as those partitions for which expected utility and expected stability are respectively
maximized.
Definition 2.6.1. Given a partition π of an instance B of RBHG, a team t ∈ π,
and a composition c ∈ C, the optimal utility of t given c is the maximum sum of the
utilities of all agents, maximized over all matchings of agents to roles in c.
For accept–reject instances of RBHG, a stable composition of t is a composition
ct
o ∈ C for which an optimal utility assignment of t has ui(r, c) > 0 for all pi ∈ t.
An optimal composition of t is a composition ct
o ∈ C for which the optimal utility
of t for all c ∈ C is maximized.
Observation 2.6.2. The optimal utility of a team t given a composition c can be
computed in time O(|t|3) by application of the Kuhn Munkres algorithm for optimiz-
ing square matrices [31]. Similarly, it can be determined whether or not a given
composition c is a stable composition for a team t.
The optimal composition ct
o ∈ C of t can be identified in time O(|C| · |t|3) by
application of the Kuhn Munkres algorithm once for each c ∈ C.
Without a central authority to assign agents to roles within a team t, agents in t
will either jointly accept a composition c or one or more agents will defect from the
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team t. Therefore, I consider evaluating the quality of a team t by either its expected
utility or expected stability across the set of candidate compositions.
Definition 2.6.3. A candidate composition c for a team t is a multiset of roles in
R to which agents in t may be matched.
A reachable composition is a candidate composition c for which there is an onto
mapping f from the the players in t to the multiset of roles c so that, for each player pi,
there is some c ∈ C such that ui(f(pi), c) > 0. Observe that any stable composition
is also a reachable composition but that the converse is not necessarily the case.
An advocated composition c for a team t is a candidate composition for which
ui(r, c) > 0 for at least one agent in pi ∈ t, for at least one role r ∈ c. Observe that
any stable composition is also an advocated composition but that the reverse is not
necessarily the case.
The number of reachable compositions is of interest in cases where agents may
be assigned to a matching which they do not necessarily accept. In the League of
Legends setting, this could occur if the match making timer runs out while players are
still making adjustments. In the case of robots on Mars, the time limit may be due
to depleting battery power requiring agents to act before an acceptable matching is
found. Notably, a composition may be reachable by a team of agents even if no agent
accepts the composition. Yet, because these forced moves can occur, it is important
to consider optimization over this set of possible results.
An advocated composition can be seen as one which at least one agent would
advocate for and therefore remain in when reached. This can occur in the case
of League of Legends when a player declares “I like this, let’s play!” or otherwise
stops changing roles. The number of advocated compositions is valuable to consider
when agents have fewer time limitations and are unlikely to accept a composition
prematurely. While it is possible for the League of Legends timer to run out, players
are capable of quitting a team and rejoining the queue before this occurs if the
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composition is particularly bad. Similarly, a group of Mars robots may choose to
defect from a team before batteries start to run out if early bargaining rounds are
failing. The set of reachable and advocated compositions consists of those which are
not only reachable by the team but would also be advocated by at least one member
of the team.
Definition 2.6.4. Let qst be the number of stable compositions for t and qat be the
number of candidate compositions for t. The expected stability of t is the ratio qst/qat
for qat > 0 or 0 if qat = 0.
Let uat be the sum of optimal utilities for all qat candidate compositions for t.
The expected utility of t is the ratio of uat/qat for qat > 0 or 0 if qat = 0.
I define the following optimization problems.
Definition 2.6.5. An optimal expected stability partition π of and instance B of
RBHG is one in which the average expected stability for all t ∈ π is maximized.
An optimal expected utility partition π of an instance B of RBHG is one in which
the average expected utility for all t ∈ π is maximized.
In this dissertation, I evaluate expected utility and expected stability both over the
set of reachable compositions and the set of reachable and advocated compositions.
Experimental procedures and results are detailed further in Chapter 5.
Copyright c© Matthew Spradling, 2015.
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Chapter 3 Related Work
A coalition formation game consists of a set of agents, a preference profile of the
agents, and the set of possible partitions, where a partition is a set of teams (subsets
of agents). In economics, Drèze and Greenberg introduced coalition formation games
to model situations where agents join teams to collaboratively produce goods for
themselves [29]. An agent’s goal in this setting is to optimize consumption of goods
within the partition.
In a hedonic setting, agents are interested in optimizing consumption for their
own teams and not others. The game is hedonic in that an agent’s preference for a
partition is determined only by the coalition to which the agent is assigned. Banerjee
et al. [13] and Bogomolnaia and Jackson [16] initiated much of the work in the hedo-
nic coalition formation game setting, which now spans a variety of models. A recent
survey by Peters and Elkind follows much of this literature [56], albeit not addressing
the recent addition to the literature of RBHGs. Hedonic coalition formation game
models have been suggested for a variety of multi-agent settings, including distributed
task allocation in wireless agents [59], communications networks [61], vehicular net-
works [62,81], adaptive smart grid management [49], and federation formation among
cloud providers [39], among others.
For general hedonic games, Ballester showed that determining whether there is
a non empty core is NP-complete [12]. Sung and Dimitrov considered farsighted
stability in hedonic games, where agents avoid defecting from a team if the defection
would induce a worse change by agents on their new or former team [27]. In other
words, agents in this setting will settle upon a less-desired partition so as to avoid
an even worse partition caused by “rocking the boat” with alterations. Sung and
Dimitrov showed that core stable and Nash stable solutions are farsighted stable while
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individually stable and contractually individually stable solutions are not necessarily
[27].
For hedonic games in which the set of teams is individually rational, Ballester
found that checking the existence of Nash stable and individually stable partitions
and checking the existence of a non empty core are all NP-complete [12]. Sung and
Dimitrov showed that these problems, in addition to the problem of determining
whether the strict core is not empty, remain NP-complete for hedonic games with ad-
ditively separable preferences [73]. Additively separable hedonic games (ASHG) [16]
allow for agents to place values on each other, making the agent population hetero-
geneous. The value an agent places on its coalition in such a game is the sum total
value it gives other agents in its coalition. Aziz et al. showed that finding envy-free
and Nash stable partitions, max sum partitions, and max min partitions are all NP-
hard [8], while finding checking if the strict core is non empty and checking whether
the grand coalition is Pareto optimal are both coNP-complete [9]. Aziz et al. provided
polynomial time algorithms for finding contractually individually stable solutions [9]
and for finding partitions satisfying envy-freeness and individual rationality [10].
The ASHG model considers agent-to-agent valuation, but these values are fixed
for any given agent-to-agent relation. ASHGs do not consider the context of the
composition an agent is in. In RBHG, values are placed on team compositions and
roles rather than individual agents. An agent may be highly desirable when paired
with other suitable agents, but undesirable without the proper composition. Each
agent has a variable role in RBHG and has preferences over which role to select for
itself given a team composition.
In the friends and enemies variants of additively separable hedonic games, each
agent considers each other agent as either a friend or an enemy [28, 72] rather than
having a more complex utility function. Dimitrov et al. showed that a strict core
stable solution can be found in polynomial time when agents value partitions based
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on an appreciation of friends with no regard to enemies, and that a core stable solution
can be found when utility is based on aversion to enemies. Lang et al. introduced the
notion of neutral relationships to this problem [50], showing that determining whether
a Nash stable partition exists is NP-complete even when agents only characterize
others as friends, enemies, or neutral parties.
Aziz, Brandt and Harrenstein introduced fractional hedonic games [7], where util-
ity is viewed as an agent’s average utility for all agents on its team. In this setting,
Aziz et al. showed that computing a core stable partition for an instance with sym-
metric preferences is NP-hard, while checking if a given partition is core stable is
coNP-complete. However, for certain special cases of fractional hedonic games, the
core is guaranteed to be non-empty. Recent work by Bilò et al. considers the price
of stability in fractional hedonic games [14]. In general, the price of stability for a
hedonic game instance is a lower bound on social welfare achieved by some global
utility function (such as max sum or max min utility) given the best case (in terms of
that utility function) of some stability measure (such as Nash stability or individual
stability). The similar price of anarchy is a lower bound on the utility function given
any solution satisfying the stability measure [53].
Brânzei and Larson introduced social distance games in which utility is measured
by an agent’s social distance to other agents on its team [18]. Social distance between
two agents is defined in economics as the distance between two agents by various
social measures (geographical, cultural, interpersonal similarity, etc.) [3, 52]. What
is important for the social distance games model is that there is some measure by
which to gauge how close two agents are to one another in terms of edge distance
in a unweighted graph containing no loops. An agents’ utility is hedonic in this
setting, defined in terms of its closeness to the other agents on its team. In this
regard the model is similar to fractional hedonic games in that the average utility for
other members of the team is taken to form the total utility [7]. While agents in role
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based hedonic games are assumed to be anonymous, social distance games assume
that connections between agents are defined.
When matching hedonic agents into pairs rather than larger teams, the prob-
lem of finding a stable assignment reduces to the stable roommates problem [47,48],
for which fast algorithms exist when a stable matching does exist. It has been ob-
served that the likelihood of there being a stable roommate assignment diminishes as
the population size increases [57]. More recently the problem of finding near stable
roommate assignments has been considered [1,15]. This relates closely to my goal of
optimizing expected stability of RBHG instances. Expected stability is a measurement
of the likelihood that a team of players will stabilize on a matching of roles. In a
multiplayer online battle arena such as League of Legends, players match themselves
into roles after they are partitioned into teams by the central authority. As a result,
there is a lack of control over precisely which roles the agents will adopt in the final
solution. The goal of optimizing expected stability is to increase the ratio of stable
compositions to the set of compositions a team may consider in this second phase.
Anonymous hedonic games have been considered where agents have preferences
over the size of the team but not over whom they are matched with [12,13]. The group
activity selection problem introduced by Darmann et al. is a variant of anonymous
hedonic games where agent preferences are dependent upon both the size of the team
and the activity being performed by the team [25].
In role based hedonic games (RBHG), agents are heterogeneous while the group
activity is fixed for a given instance. An RBHG agent holds preferences over its own
role and the roles of its teammates. Preferences are not necessarily based upon the
size of a team. In these ways, RBHG considers the problem of anonymous agents in
a different way than existing work that focuses on differences in team sizes and group
activities.
Work in hedonic coalition formation for large networks has considered a different
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approach to handling anonymity. Taking, for example, the case of researchers forming
research groups: Hoefer et al. have observed that agents may choose not to form
groups with agents they do not already know [41]. Hoefer et al.’s work considers an
agent to have visibility only for its existing base of known agents and the resulting
issues in locality. Here, agents can learn new contacts over the course of forming
teams, maintain a permanent contact list, and reference temporary contacts with
teams which include members who are not yet a part of their permanent contact
list. In this way, the partially anonymous game may slowly transform into a normal
hedonic coalition formation game without anonymity, where all agents have finally
added one another to their contact lists. This is a different problem where anonymity
is considered to be a problem to overcome.
In RBHG, anonymity is a fact of the game. Agents do not express their utilities
in the RBHG setting in the context of who is on the team, and thus do not build up a
local set of contacts. It is reasonable to combine the two problems, where agents have
a set of known agents and otherwise have utilities for roles and compositions in absence
of local contacts. This takes the two “pure” scenarios and creates a more expressive
system to handle both preferences for locally known agents and preferences for “types
of colleagues.” In the research team formation problem this would be especially helpful
for young researchers who have not yet built a full portfolio of contacts. Alternatively,
mock team formation using RBHG utilities could be used to make recommendations
for new local contacts, allowing for more direct evaluation of a smaller subset of the
population.
Sometimes a model of coalition formation can be seen as an overlapping of existing
models. Consider the anonymous stable invitation problem [51] introduced by Lee
and Shoham. This setting combines several variants of hedonic coalition formation
games into a single problem, where an organizer for an event wishes to invite the
maximum size subset of agents who will all attend the event together. The problem
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could be extended to maximizing the total value (perhaps in terms of donations) of
the individuals invited, though it can be assumed that all agents have equal value.
Again, this setting may have utility for both the number of individuals invited and
for the specific individuals who will be in attendance. Rather than attempting to
form a large number of teams, the goal is to determine the largest stable coalition
(stable in that all agents in the coalition will accept it). The authors observe that
this new problem bears similarities to both additively separable hedonic games and
anonymous hedonic games. Combining the two problems, this work allows for the
possibility of utilities over both individual agents and the size of the team. The goal
of the game is analogous to determining the maximum sized individually rational
team which no agent would reject in favor of sitting out of the event. If the problem
were extended to inviting agents to several different events, it could be viewed as an
overlay of additively separable hedonic games and the group activity selection problem.
Recent work investigates problems in hedonic games caused by the presence of
a moral hazard: an economic phenomenon where one agents takes on production
responsibilities for which another agent bears the risk [76]. When teams can only
make balanced transfers of production after initial assignment, stability is negatively
affected. When teams cannot make production transfers at all, stability is positively
affected but efficiency (utility) is negatively effected. This is an interesting setting to
consider for RBHG problems, and relates to the problem of ensuring honest reporting
of preferences and requirements (such as voter manipulation in elections [54, 84] or
dishonest budgets reporting [23]).
Recent work related to hedonic games considers the mechanism design prob-
lem [80] for additively separable hedonic games where all utilities are non-negative.
In this problem, the desirable properties considered for a matchmaking mechanism
are to ensure that the mechanism creates no incentive for an agent to misreport its
preferences and that the mechanism ensures optimal social welfare and fairness. I ob-
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serve that problems in this setting have a trivially Pareto optimal solution consisting
of the grand coalition, where all agents are assigned to the same team. This is due to
the assumption that all utilities are non-negative and additively separable. However,
the more interesting cases for my work are when team size has a maximum value less
than the number of players.
The role of an agent in the RBHG model can be seen either as the task the agent
is performing, the way the agent performs a task, or some other conceptual quality
such as the color of the agent’s shoes. What is important is that an agent may fulfill
different roles and may have utility for different roles depending upon the composition
of roles it is presented with in a team. The notion of roles has been applied previously
to object-oriented database programming. Albano et al. developed Fibonacci as an
object-oriented database programming language in which data objects are manipu-
lated through the changing roles that they fill [4]. Gottlob et al. extended this work
to model additional features, such as having qualified roles which are multiple distinct
instances of the same role (a Project Manager role for each of multiple projects, for
example) [38]. Gottlob’s use of the term role differs from the RBHG model in that I
consider an agent to, at any one time, fulfill a single role rather than multiple roles at
once. It is similar in that both works consider the possibility that a single entity may
change roles over time, fulfilling different positions while still retaining basic qualities
(in the RBHG case, utilities for different roles and compositions). When an agent
might fulfill multiple roles at once, or provide a set of skills to complete different tasks,
Tran-Tranh et al. introduced the coalition skill vector model for coalition formation
games where each agent possesses a set of skills, there is a set of tasks to perform,
and the value of a partition is based upon the number or total payoff of tasks the
teams can jointly complete [74]. In the RBHG model, I am concerned with the single
role that an agent is fulfilling at any given time and possible changes from one role
to another when determining the single composition of the team.
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Related work in the social aspect of roles in online games considers the phe-
nomenon of gender swapping, where players choose avatars of a gender (here seen
as male or female) other than one that they are commonly associated with (either
personally or by society as a whole) [67]. This work investigates both the reasons
that players may engage in gender swapping and what can be predicted about their
in-game spending habits. Additional work considers the impact of prosocial behavior
in online games [78], both in general and as it relates to gender swapping. Prosocial
behavior includes behaviors such as sharing, volunteering time and money to others,
and generally taking actions in an effort to help others or society as a whole [5,19,55].
This work relates to determining predictable utility functions which agents may hold
for roles and compositions in RBHG settings. For example, an agent who exhibits
prosocial behavior may be more inclined to accept a variety of role assignments if it
will help a team achieve a preferred composition. Another agent may select avatars
based upon aesthetics rather than just the roles that they fulfill. Consider a case
where one subset of agents selects League of Legends champions based upon the set
of tactical roles they fulfill (Support, Attacker, Defender, etc.) and their related tacti-
cal compositions, another subset considers the colors of their uniforms (Teal, Mauve,
Salmon, etc.) and their related aesthetic compositions, and still another considers
both aspects when evaluating a team. Addressing these different types of utilities in
practice may require multi-objective utility functions which consider roles and com-
positions of various definitions as well as other aspects of avatars being selected. In
this dissertation, I consider the simpler problem of having utilities only for role and
composition pairs from a single set of roles that all agents agree upon.
Consider the following setting. In capstone computer science courses, students
are sometimes grouped into equal size project teams. For a team of five students,
one student may prefer a team of two skilled programmers, one designer, and two
writers. Her second choice might be one programmer, two designers, and two writers.
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In the first case, the student wants to be one of the two programmers and not the
only designer. In the second, she wants to one of the two designers, and definitely
not the only programmer.
This problem can be modeled as an RBHG. The ASHG model allows students to
express utility values for each other, but ASHG preferences are context-free agent-
to-agent assessments. Alice may wish to join Bob’s coalition when he needs a pro-
grammer, but not when he needs a writer. In RBHG, an agent need only express
preferences on which roles and compositions she prefers. This evaluation may be
easier to accurately poll.
In online games such as League of Legends and Defense of the Ancients 2 [58],
where players select avatars having different skills and abilities, success of a team
can depend on which roles are filled by the subset of avatars selected. While players
are largely anonymous, preferences in terms of roles performed by teammates to
achieve some objective can be described. This adds to what it means to be an
agent. Rather than having agents who are immutable objects, a single agent can be
perceived by other agents to be “worth” different amounts to another agent on her
team depending upon what role she is fulfilling. This task-dependent agent valuation
also has application with distributed task allocation in wireless agents [60].
For instances where |C| · m is smaller than |P |, where m is the maximum size
of a composition in |C|, the required input data for RBHG instances will be smaller
than the required input for ASHG. Input for an ASHG instance requires each agent
to hold a specific utility for each other agent within the population. This could be
represented as a |P |×|P | matrix of utility values, U , where U [i, j] is the utility that pi
holds for pj. In RBHG, the input can be represented as a (|C|·m)×|P | matrix. While
there are millions of players in League of Legends [46], there are only around 5 basic
roles to potentially fill (AD Carry, Support, Mage, etc.) and a maximum team size of
5. The input required for team formation in this setting will be orders of magnitude
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smaller in RBHG than if this game were treated as an ASHG. In the case where
utilities are additively separable, I show in Chapter 4 that an instance of ASHG can
be represented as an instance of RBHG. This use of an additively separable utility
function over the available roles can reduce the necessary size of an RBHG instance
even more, when applicable.
Stability is a property which, in certain settings, we expect to be generated nat-
urally by the agents. That is, should the agents be allowed to either accept or reject
a partition, they will only choose to accept a partition which is stable. This relates
to a game such as League of Legends and Defense of the Ancients 2 where players
have agency and may choose not to play if a team composition is undesirable (recall
that books are an option). In these games agents are only partitioned to teams by
the central authority and are not automatically matched to roles. Therefore, even if
agents are assigned to a partition which contains an optimal and stable matching of
roles within the teams, it is not guaranteed that the agents will stabilize on that par-
ticular matching. This observation directs the goals of optimizing expected stability
and expected utility of a partition.
Consider a team of Mars robots weighing the pros and cons of removing John-
nybot’s drill arm and replacing it with a high-definition camera. Perhaps the re-
configuration will help to achieve a single composition currently desired, but would
significantly reduce the ability of the team to complete other objectives also consid-
ered valuable. By optimizing the expected utility or stability of a team in terms of the
abilities of robots to fulfill certain roles and their independent valuations of certain
compositions (roles needed to perform certain important tasks), a team will be more
likely to remain stable against shifting needs and opportunities. When considering a
single team comparing two possible utility functions (one with Johnnybot’s drill arm,
and one with the camera), I can compute the optimal composition utility, the expected
utility and the expected stability for both configurations in time polynomial in the size
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of the input. This would allow for a fast comparison between working with the ex-
isting configurations and the expected value of making the proposed change. In this
dissertation, I consider not only the likelihood that a team of agents will stabilize on
a single productive composition but that over time the agents will work well together
in a variety of circumstances. While I do not consider the ethical implications of
removing Johnnybot’s arm, quickly determining which modifications to make could
improve productivity of robots on a distant world and reduce conflict over the limited
resources.
Copyright c© Matthew Spradling, 2015.
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Chapter 4 Complexity Results
In this chapter, we prove that determining whether or not there exists a perfect solu-
tion of an RBHG instance is NP-complete and that the decision problems related to
finding MaxSum and MaxMin solutions are both NP-complete. We prove that verifi-
cation of Pareto optimality and contractual strict core stability of the grand coalition
are both coNP-complete problems in RBHG, and that the remaining stability prob-
lems considered in this dissertation are all NP-complete for RBHG.
4.1 Complexity of Optimization
Definition 4.1.1. An instance of Special RBHG is an instance of RBHG such that
for each agent pi ∈ P , each cj ∈ C, and each rk ∈ c, ui(rk, cj) ∈ {0, 1} and ui(rk, cj) =
1 only if cj is uniform, namely it consists of |c| copies of a single role r.
In other words, each agent finds some non-empty set of single-role team composi-
tions acceptable (utility 1), and no other types of team compositions acceptable.
Definition 4.1.2. The language Perfect RBHG consists of those instances of
RBHG for which a perfect solution exists, and Perfect Special RBHG consists
of those instances of Special RBHG for which a perfect solution exists.
In Special RBHG instances, the question of a perfect solution reduces to the
problem of finding a MaxMin solution, or the decision problem of whether there’s a
partition with MaxMin value m.
Consider the Exact 3Cover problem:
GIVEN a set S ⊆ P({1, ..., q}) where all elements of S have size 3,
IS THERE a subset T ⊆ S such that T partitions {1, ..., q}?
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For example, given q = 6 and S1 = {{1, 2, 4}, {3, 5, 6}, {3, 4, 5}}, there is an exact
three cover S ′1 = {{1, 2, 4}, {3, 5, 6}}. Given q = 6 and S2 = {{1, 2, 4}, {4, 5, 6}, {3, 4, 5}},
no exact three cover exists. Note that though all elements in {1, ..., q} can be found
in elements of S2, an exact cover requires that each element be found exactly once.
Exact 3Cover is NP-complete [37].
Theorem 4.1.3. Perfect Special RBHG is NP-complete.
Proof. To show that Perfect Special RBHG is in NP, consider the following
NP algorithm. Given an instance of Perfect Special RBHG, guess a partition
and evaluate its MaxMin value. To compute the MaxMin value, compute the utility
of each of the at most |P | teams (time O(|P | · l) for each coalition, where l is the
complexity of table lookup for an individual’s utility for a particular team and role),
stopping and rejecting if any coalition has utility 0, else accepting.
This checking is in time polynomial in the size of the input.
To show NP-hardness, we show that Exact 3Cover ≤Pm Special Perfect
RBHG. In other words, given an instance E = 〈q, S〉 of Exact 3Cover, we con-
struct an instance RE of Special Perfect RBHG such that E ∈ Exact 3Cover
iff RE ∈ Special Perfect RBHG.
RE will have the property that, for each agent pi ∈ P , the only acceptable teams
are uniform, i.e., consist of |t| copies of a single role. Thus, the question is whether
they can be assigned to an acceptable team; the role for that team will be acceptable.
Consider E = 〈q, S〉. For each set si ∈ S, RE will have a role ri ∈ R and a
corresponding team composition ci = {ri, ri, ri}. P = {1, ..., q}. The desired team
size is m = 3. Each agent pj desires those team compositions s such that j ∈ s.
There is an exact three cover of {1, ..., q} iff there is an assignment of agents to
teams of size three such that each team corresponds to an element of S.
Consider an exact three cover X ⊂ S. Then for each j ≤ q there is an si ∈ X
such that j ∈ s. The exact three cover X corresponds to a partition π for RE that
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assigns an acceptable team to each agent. The matching M is implicit with each
agent assigned to a unique acceptable role within its team t ∈ π. There is only one
acceptable composition for that set of agents, namely ci = {ri, ri, ri}.
Now assume that there is a perfect solution (π,M) for RE. Then for each i ≤ |P |
there is a ti ∈ π having a composition ci and such that ui(ri, ci) = 1. The partition π
and matching M corresponds to a solution X ⊂ S that is an exact three cover of S.
Therefore, the Perfect Special RBHG problem is NP-hard. q
Definition 4.1.4. The language MaxSum RBHG consists of pairs 〈B, k〉, where B
is an instance of RBHG, k is an integer, and the MaxSum value of B is ≥ k. We
denote the MaxSum value of a solution (π,M) as MaxSum(π,M). MaxSum Special
RBHG consists of those instances of Special RBHG for which the MaxSum value is
|P |.
Definition 4.1.5. The language MaxMin RBHG consists of pairs 〈B, k〉, where B
is an instance of RBHG, k is an integer, and the MaxMin value is ≥ k. We denote the
MaxMin value of a solution (π,M) as MaxMin(π,M). MaxMin Special RBHG
consists of those instances of Special RBHG for which the MaxMin value is |t|.
Theorem 4.1.6. MaxMin Special RBHG and MaxSum Special RBHG are
both NP-hard.
Proof. A Special RBHG solution (π,M) for B is perfect iff
∑
pi∈P ui(r
i, ci) = |P | iff
MaxMin(π,M) = |tmin|, where tmin is the team having minimum utility, iff 〈B, |P |〉 ∈
MaxSum RBHG iff MaxSum(π,M) = |P | iff 〈B, |tmin|〉 ∈MaxMin RBHG. There-
fore MaxMin Special RBHG and MaxSum Special RBHG are both NP-hard.
q
Corollary 4.1.7. The general cases of Perfect RBHG, MaxSum RBHG, and
MaxMin RBHG are all NP-hard.
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Proof. Observe that the reductions given for Perfect Special RBHG, MaxSum
Special RBHG, and MaxMin Special RBHG are also reductions for Perfect
RBHG, MaxSum RBHG, and MaxMin RBHG.
Therefore the general cases of Perfect RBHG, MaxSum RBHG and MaxMin
RBHG are all NP-hard. q
4.2 Complexity of Stability
Definition 4.2.1. The language NS RBHG consists of instances of RBHG for which
there exists a Nash stable solution.
Theorem 4.2.2. NS RBHG is NP-complete.
Proof. To see that NS RBHG is in NP, observe that Nash stability for a single
RBHG agent can be verified in time O(|P | · |R| · l), where l is the complexity of
table lookup for an individual’s utility for a particular team and role. Verifying the
property for all agents can be done in time O(|P |2 · |R| · l). To verify Nash stability
for a single agent, check if the agent can improve utility by moving from its current
team to another team (with any of the possible roles) or by changing from its current
role to another role on the same team. In the worst case, where every agent is on a
team by itself, this requires consideration of each of the |P | possible teams and each
of the |R| possible roles on each team. Verifying the property for all agents requires
performing the above test for each of the |P | agents.
Next, we construct a reduction, f , from NS ASHG to NS RBHG. Let A be an
instance of NS ASHG with a population N and utility function vector V .
We define f(A) = (P,R,C, U) to be an instance of RBHG. We set P = N and
R = {r1, ..., r|N |}. The set C is not constructed explicitly in this case, nor is utility for
each {r, c} pair explicitly stored. Instead, utility of an agent for a team is defined by an
additively separable function over the roles in the composition to which it is assigned.
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An agent assigned to its own role in a team by itself has utility ui(ri, {ri}) = 0. Define
MaxAbsValue(A) as the maximum absolute value of utility for any agent p ∈ P . An
agent assigned to a role k 6= i has utility ui(rk, c) = −MaxAbsValue(A)·|P |−1, for any
composition c. For teams of size m ≥ 2 set ui(ri, c) = Σj∈cvi(j) = Σj∈cui(ri, {ri, rj}).
Observation 4.2.3. The only partitions with positive values consist of coalitions
where, for each pi ∈ P , pi is assigned to role ri.
Let f(A) be in NS RBHG and let (π,M) be a Nash stable solution of f(A).
From (π,M) we construct a partition π′ of A using f−1. Since (π,M) maps each
pi ∈ P to the role ri representing f−1(pi) = ni ∈ N , we have that f−1(π,M) = π′ is
a well-defined partition of A.
To show that π′ is a Nash stable partition of A, consider the following proof by
contradiction. Suppose there were an agent ni ∈ N and a team t′ ∈ π′ such that
vi(t
′ ∪ {ni}) > vi(ti). Consider that the corresponding agent pi ∈ P in a team t ∈ π
with composition c will have ui(r
i, c∪{ri}) > ui(ri, ci). This contradicts the premise
that (π,M) is a Nash stable solution of f(A). Therefore if f(A) is in NS RBHG
then A is in NS ASHG.
Now let π be a Nash stable partition ofA. Let (π′,M) = f(π) be the corresponding
solution in f(A). For each agent pi ∈ P , ui(ri, ci) = vi(ti) where ti ∈ π is composed
of the agents represented by the roles in ci.
By the same argument as in the previous case, we get that (π′,M) is also Nash
stable. Therefore if A is in NS ASHG then f(A) is in NS RBHG.
Therefore f(A) is in NS RBHG iff A is in NS ASHG. Thus, we have shown that
f is a reduction from NS ASHG to NS RBHG.
q
Definition 4.2.4. The language EF NS RBHG consists of those instances of RBHG
for which there exists an envy free Nash stable solution.
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Theorem 4.2.5. EF NS RBHG is NP-complete.
Proof. To see that EF NS RBHG is in NP, we observe that envy-freeness and Nash
stability for a single RBHG agent can be verified in time O(|P |2 · |R|). Verifying
the property for all agents requires time O(|P |3 · |R|). To verify Nash stability for a
single agent, check if the agent can improve utility by moving from its current team
to another team (with any of the possible roles) or by changing from its current role
to another role on the same team. In the worst case, where every agent is on a team
by itself, this requires consideration of each of the |P | possible teams and each of the
|R| possible roles on each team. To verify envy-freeness requires an additional |P |
comparisons, where the agent checks if it would improve utility for being in the same
role and composition as each of the other agents. That is, rather than joining each
other team and seeing if utility improves, we swap roles and team positions between
the agent and each of |P | − 1 other agents to see if utility improves with any such
swap. Verifying the two properties for all agents requires performing the above test
for each of the |P | agents.
Next, we construct a reduction, f , from EF NS ASHG to EF NS RBHG.
Let A be an instance of EF NS ASHG with a population N and utility function
vector V . We use the same function f as in Theorem 4.2.2 to generate an instance
f(A) = (P,R,C, U) of RBHG.
Let f(A) be in EF NS RBHG and let (π,M) be an envy free Nash stable solution
of f(A).
From (π,M) we construct a partition π′ of A using f−1. Since (π,M) maps each
pi ∈ P to the role ri representing f−1(pi) = ni ∈ N , we have that f−1(π,M) = π′ is
a well-defined partition of A.
To show that π is a Nash stable and envy-free partition of A, consider the following
proof by contradiction. Suppose that π is not envy Free; that there is a pair of agents
ni, nj ∈ N such that vi(ti) < Σk∈tjvi(k). Consider that the corresponding agents
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pi, pj ∈ P will have the property that ui(ri, ci) < ui(rj, cj). This contradicts the
premise that (π,M) is an envy free solution of f(A). Now suppose that π is not Nash
stable; that there is an agent ni ∈ N and a team t′ ∈ π′ such that vi(t′∪{ni}) > vi(ti).
Consider that the corresponding agent pi ∈ P will have ui(ri, c′ ∪ {ri}) > ui(ri, ci).
This contradicts the premise that (π,M) is a Nash stable solution of f(A). Therefore
if f(A) is in EF NS RBHG then A is in EF NS ASHG.
Now let π be a Nash stable partition ofA. Let (π′,M) = f(π) be the corresponding
partition in f(A). For each agent pi ∈ P , ui(ri, ci) = vi(ti) where ti ∈ π is composed
of the agents represented by the roles in ci.
By the same argument as in the previous case, we get that (π′,M) is also envy
free and Nash stable. Therefore if A is in EF NS ASHG then f(A) is in EF NS
RBHG.
Therefore f(A) is in EF NS RBHG iff A is in EF NS ASHG. Thus, f is a
reduction from EF NS ASHG to EF NS RBHG.
q
Definition 4.2.6. The language IS RBHG consists of those instances of RBHG for
which there exists an individually stable solution.
Theorem 4.2.7. IS RBHG is NP-complete.
Proof. To see that IS RBHG is in NP, observe that individual stability for a single
RBHG agent can be verified in time O(|P | · |R|). Verifying the property for all agents
requires time O(|P |2 · |R|). To verify individual stability for a single agent, check if
the agent can improve utility by moving from its current team to another team (with
any of the possible roles) without decreasing utility for the agents already on the
new team. In the worst case, where every agent is on a team by itself, this requires
consideration of each of the |P | possible teams and each of the |R| possible roles on
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each team. Verifying the property for all agents requires performing the above test
for each of the |P | agents.
Next, we construct a reduction, f , from IS ASHG to IS RBHG. Let A be an
instance of IS ASHG with a population N and utility function vector V . We use
the same function f as in Theorem 4.2.2 to generate an instance f(A) = (P,R,C, U)
of RBHG.
Let f(A) be in IS RBHG and let (π,M) be an individually stable solution of
f(A). From (π,M) we construct a partition π′ of A using f−1. Since (π,M) maps
each pi ∈ P to the role ri representing f−1(pi) = ni ∈ N , we have that f−1(π,M) = π′
is a well-defined partition of A.
To show that π is an individually stable partition of A, consider the following
proof by contradiction. Suppose there were an agent ni ∈ N on a team ti ∈ π′ and
a team t′ 6= ti ∈ π′ such that vi(t′ ∪ {ni}) > vi(ti) and for all nj 6= ni ∈ ti we have
that vj(t
i) ≤ vj(ti − {ni}). Consider that for the corresponding agent pi ∈ P in a
team ti ∈ π with composition ci there will be a team t′ 6= ti ∈ π with composition c′
such that ui(r
i, c′ ∪ {ri}) > ui(ri, ci) and for all pj 6= pi ∈ ti we have that uj(rj, ci) ≤
uj(r
j, cj − {ri}). This contradicts the premise that (π,M) is an individually stable
solution of f(A). Therefore if f(A) is in IS RBHG then A is in IS ASHG.
Now let π be an individually stable partition of A. Let (π′,M) = f(π) be the
corresponding partition in f(A). For each agent pi ∈ P , ui(ri, ci) = vi(ti) where
ti ∈ π is composed of the agents represented by the roles in ci.
By the same argument as in the previous case, we get that (π′,M) is also indi-
vidually stable. Therefore if A is in IS ASHG then f(A) is in IS RBHG.
Therefore f(A) is in IS RBHG iff A is in IS ASHG. Thus, f is a reduction from
IS ASHG to IS RBHG.
q
Definition 4.2.8. The language CS RBHG consists of those instances of RBHG
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for which there exists a non-empty core stable solution.
Theorem 4.2.9. CS RBHG is NP-complete.
Proof. The construction given in the proof of Theorem 4.2.2 also gives a reduction
from CS ASHG to CS RBHG.
Let f(A) be in CS RBHG and let (π,M) be a core stable solution of f(A). From
(π,M) we construct a partition π′ of A using f−1. Since (π,M) maps each pi ∈ P
to the role ri representing f−1(pi) = ni ∈ N , we have that f−1(π,M) = π′ is a
well-defined partition of A.
To show that π is a core stable partition of A, consider the following proof by
contradiction. Suppose there were a subset of agents N ′ ⊂ N such that, for each
ni ∈ N ′, vi(N ′) > vi(ti). Consider that the corresponding subset of agents P ′ ⊂ P
such that, for each pi ∈ P ′, ui(ri, c′) > ui(ri, ci) where c′ ⊂ R is composed of the roles
represented by the agents in P ′. This contradicts the premise that (π,M) is a core
stable solution of f(A). Therefore if f(A) is in CS RBHG then A is in CS ASHG.
Now let π be a core stable partition of A. Let (π′,M) = f(π) be the corresponding
solution of f(A). For each agent pi ∈ P , ui(ri, ci) = vi(ti) where ti ∈ π is composed
of the agents represented by the roles in ci. By the same argument as in the previous
case, we get that (π′,M) is also core stable. Therefore if A is in CS ASHG then
f(A) is in CS RBHG.
Therefore f(A) is in CS RBHG iff A is in CS ASHG. Thus, f is a reduction
from CS ASHG to CS RBHG.
q
Definition 4.2.10. The language SCS RBHG consists of those instances of RBHG
for which there exists a non-empty strict core stable solution.
Theorem 4.2.11. SCS RBHG is NP-complete.
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Proof. The construction given in the proof of Theorem 4.2.2 also gives a reduction
from SCS ASHG to SCS RBHG.
Let f(A) be in SCS RBHG and let (π,M) be a strict core stable solution of
f(A). From (π,M) we construct a partition π′ of A using f−1. Since (π,M) maps
each pi ∈ P to the role ri representing f−1(pi) = ni ∈ N , we have that f−1(π,M) = π′
is a well-defined partition of A.
To show that π is a strict core stable partition of A, consider the following proof
by contradiction. Suppose there were a subset of agents N ′ ⊂ N such that, for each
ni ∈ N ′, vi(N ′) ≥ vi(ti) and vj(N ′) > vj(tj) for at least one nj ∈ N ′. Consider that
the corresponding subset of agents P ′ ⊂ P such that, for each pi ∈ P ′, ui(ri, c′) ≥
ui(r
i, ci) and uj(r
j, c) > uj(r
j, cj) for at least one pj ∈ P ′, where c′ ⊂ R is composed
of the roles represented by the agents in P ′. This contradicts the premise that (π,M)
is a strict core stable solution of f(A). Therefore if f(A) is in SCS RBHG then A
is in SCS ASHG.
Now let π be a strict core stable partition of A. Let (π′,M) = f(π) be the
corresponding solution of f(A). For each agent pi ∈ P , ui(ri, ci) = vi(ti) where ti ∈ π
is composed of the agents represented by the roles in ci. By the same argument as in
the previous case, we get that (π′,M) is also strict core stable. Therefore if A is in
SCS ASHG then f(A) is in SCS RBHG.
Therefore f(A) is in SCS RBHG iff A is in SCS ASHG. Thus, f is a reduction
from SCS ASHG to SCS RBHG.
q
Definition 4.2.12. The grand coalition for RBHG is a partition π of all agents to
a single team t. In RBHG, there are several possible grand coalitions with different
distributions of roles.
Definition 4.2.13. The language GRAND PO RBHG consists of those instances
of RBHG for which there exists a partition consisting of the grand coalition and some
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assignment of agents to roles that is Pareto optimal.
Theorem 4.2.14. GRAND PO RBHG is coNP-complete.
Proof. First we show that GRAND PO RBHG is in coNP. Given two solutions
(π,M) and (π′,M ′) for an instance of RBHG, we can check in polynomial time if
(π′,M ′) is a solution such that ui(r
′i, c′i) ≥ ui(ri, ci) for all pi ∈ P and uj(r′j, c′j) >
uj(r
j, cj) for at least one pj ∈ P . Thus, given an instance f(A) of RBHG and a
solution (π,M) consisting of the grand coalition, it is NP to decide that π is not
Pareto optimal.
The construction given in the proof of Theorem 4.2.2 also gives a reduction from
GRAND PO ASHG to GRAND PO RBHG.
Let f(A) be in GRAND PO RBHG and let (π,M) be a Pareto optimal solution
of f(A) consisting of the grand coalition. Observe that each agent pi ∈ P must be
assigned to ri ∈ R, or else (π,M) could not be Pareto optimal.
Observation 4.2.15. By the construction, each agent pi ∈ P has ui(r, c) =
−MaxAbsValue(A) · |P | − 1 when r 6= ri. Since (π,M) is a Pareto optimal solution,
each agent pi ∈ π must be matched to ri ∈ R. Otherwise the partition could be
improved by assigning each agent pi to its role r
i.
Therefore if a partition π consisting of the grand coalition is Pareto optimal, then
M(pi) = r
i for each agent pi ∈ P .
From (π,M), a Pareto optimal solution of f(A) consisting of the grand coalition,
we construct a partition π of A using f−1. Since (π,M) maps each pi ∈ P to the
role ri representing f−1(pi) = ni ∈ N , we have that f−1(π,M) = π is a well-defined
partition of A consisting of the grand coalition.
To show that π is a Pareto optimal partition of A, consider the following proof
by contradiction. Suppose there were a partition π′δ of A such that, for each ni ∈ N
assigned to its team tiδ ∈ π′δ, vi(tiδ) ≥ vi(N) and for at least one nj ∈ N assigned
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to its team tjδ ∈ πdelta′, vj(t
j
δ) > vi(N). Consider that the corresponding a solution
f(π′δ,M
′
δ) of f(A) such that each agent pi is assigned to r
i and, for each pi ∈ P ,
ui(r
i, ciδ) ≥ ui(ri, ci) and, for at least one pj ∈ P , uj(rj, c
j
δ) > ui(r
j, cj). This con-
tradicts the premise that (π,M) is a Pareto optimal solution for f(A). Therefore if
f(A) is in GRAND PO RBHG then A is in GRAND PO ASHG.
Now let π be a Pareto optimal partition of A consisting of the grand coalition.
Let (π′,M ′) = f(π) be the corresponding solution of f(A) consisting of the grand
coalition. For each agent pi ∈ P , ui(ri, ci) = vi(ti) where ti ∈ π is composed of agents
represented by roles in ci. By the same argument as in the previous case, we get that
(π′,M ′) is also Pareto optimal. Therefore if A is in GRAND PO ASHG then f(A)
is in GRAND PO RTHG.
Therefore f(A) is in GRAND PO RBHG iff A is in GRAND PO ASHG.
Thus, f is a reduction from GRAND PO ASHG to GRAND PO RBHG. q
Definition 4.2.16. The language GRAND CSCS RBHG consists of those in-
stances of RBHG for which there exists a partition consisting of the grand coalition
and some assignment of agents to roles which is contractual strict core stable.
Theorem 4.2.17. GRAND CSCS RBHG is coNP-complete.
Proof. First we show that GRAND CSCS RBHG is in coNP by the following non-
deterministic polynomial time algorithm. Given a solution (π,M) consisting of the
grand coalition for an instance of RBHG, guess a team t′ and a composition c′. If
(t′, c′) weakly blocks (π,M) for some matching of roles in c′ to agents in t′, then (π,M)
is not contractual strict core stable.
The construction given in the proof of Theorem 4.2.2 also gives a reduction from
GRAND CSCS ASHG to GRAND CSCS RBHG.
Let f(A) be in GRAND CSCS RBHG and let (π,M) be a contractual strict
core stable solution of f(A) consisting of the grand coalition. Observe that each agent
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in pi ∈ π must be assigned to ri ∈ R, or else π could not be Pareto optimal. This
follows from Observation 4.2.15.
From (π,M), a contractual strict core stable solution of f(A) consisting of the
grand coalition, we construct a partition π′ of A using f−1. Since (π,M) maps each
pi ∈ P to the role ri representing f−1(pi) = ni ∈ N , we have that f−1(π,M) = π′ is
a well-defined partition of A consisting of the grand coalition.
To show that π is a contractual strict core stable partition of A, consider the fol-
lowing proof by contradiction. Suppose π′ of A is not contractual strict core stable.
Then there there exists a weakly blocking team t′ of π′. Consider that the correspond-
ing team t′ and composition c′ which weakly blocks f(π,M), where the composition
c′ consists of roles for agents in t′ and each agent pi ∈ t′ is matched to its own role
ri ∈ c′. This contradicts the premise that (π,M) is Pareto optimal. Therefore if f(A)
is in GRAND CSCS RBHG then A is in GRAND CSCS ASHG.
Now let π be a contractual strict core stable partition of A consisting of the grand
coalition. Let (π′,M ′) = f(π) be the corresponding solution of f(A) consisting of the
grand coalition. For each agent pi ∈ P , ui(ri, ci) = vi(ti) where ti ∈ π is composed of
agents represented by roles in ci. By the same argument as in the previous case, we
get that (π′,M ′) is also contractual strict core stable. Therefore if A is in GRAND
CSCS ASHG then f(A) is in GRAND CSCS RTHG.
Therefore f(A) is in GRAND CSCS RBHG iff A is in GRAND CSCS ASHG.
Thus, f is a reduction from GRAND CSCS ASHG to GRAND CSCS RBHG.
q
Copyright c© Matthew Spradling, 2015.
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Chapter 5 Heuristic Matchmaking Results
In this Chapter I present several experimental procedures and the results of their
application to real world matchmaking scenarios. The main research question of this
chapter is whether or not the algorithms I propose can produce partitions with better
optimization results than partitioning without intent to optimize.
In Section 5.3 I outline a procedure I have used to scrape real world data from
League of Legends matches. I detail a few observations about the structure of the real
world data and propose two different utility functions for converting the matchmaking
data into RBHG instances. In Section 5.4 I detail four methods of generating ran-
domized RBHG instances to test extreme cases of observed properties in the League
of Legends data: the probability distribution over roles and compositions, the pres-
ence of a single role which is popular to all agents, the presence of a single role which
is unpopular to all agents (yet still required for several compositions they do prefer),
and the phenomenon of each agent having devotion to a single role it prefers.
In Sections 5.1 and 5.2, I provide implementations of two heuristic matchmaking
procedures which I call greedy voting heuristic and greedy local search heuristic. The
greedy voting heuristic iteratively forms new teams by selecting a single composition
to optimize on. The local search heuristic instead begins with a single agent and
iteratively adds agents to the team which provide the most improvement to the total
utility of the optimal matching for that team. Both algorithms run in polynomial
time in the size of the input.
I evaluate the two algorithms on RBHG instances generated from the League of
Legends matchmaking data and the four experimental utility functions for randomly
generated RBHG instances. I compare the results of the algorithms to randomly
generated partitions on multiple optimization goals in Section 5.5.
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Greedy local search shows general improvement over greedy voting and random
partitions. The instances generated from the League of Legends data and on two of
the four experimental utility functions tend to produce fewer reachable compositions
in any given partition. This is especially true for partitions formed by the greedy
voting heuristic.
5.1 Greedy Voting Heuristic
A voting rule is a function mapping a vector a of voters’ votes to one of the b candi-
dates in a candidate set c. With the scoring voting rule, each voter assigns a score to
each candidate within the set. The winner of the election is the candidate with the
most total points over all voters in the election.
Definition 5.1.1. [24] Let a = 〈a1, · · · , am〉 be a vector of integers such that a1 <
a2 < . . . < am. For each voter, a candidate receives a1 points if it is ranked first by
the voter, a2 points if it is ranked second, etc. The score sc of candidate c is the total
number of points the candidate receives. This is a scoring voting rule.
By modeling agents as voters in an election and their preferences over team com-
positions and roles as votes, the scoring voting rule can be applied to iteratively hold
elections over the set of compositions. Once a composition is selected, the set of
agents who optimize total utility for that composition can be assigned to a team
together. This greedy approach narrows the problem to optimizing utility for a single
composition rather than across all compositions.
For my procedure called greedy voting heuristic, the voters are the agents
and the candidates are pairs (c, r) where c is a composition and r ∈ c. An election
is run upon the candidate set to select the most-preferred composition ci. A set of
|ci| voters with the highest utility for that composition is selected to form a team
and removed from the population. These agents are matched to roles within the
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composition by application of the Kuhn Munkres algorithm for optimizing square
matrices [31]. This optimizes total utility of the matching for players on the new
team. Their votes are removed, and a new election is held on the reduced candidate
set. This procedure continues until all |P | agents have been matched to teams. The
following pseudocode describes this greedy algorithm [69]:
Algorithm 1 GreedyVoting(RTHG instance G, empty partition π, min(|c|) = m)
b =: |C|
for |C| compositions c0 → cb do
for |ci| positions r0 → r|ci| ∈ ci do
calculate the sum of agent votes on 〈ci, rj〉. %O(|P |)
end for
end for
for |P |/m coalitions t0 → t|P |/m−1 to assign to π do
find the set of compositions Cmax for which the sum of total votes is maximized.
%O(|C| ·m)
select one composition ci uniformly at random from within the set.
for |ci| positions r0 → r|ci|−1 ∈ ci do
find the set of agents Pmax(ci, rj) for whom the individual agent’s vote for
〈ci, rj〉 is maximized. %This takes time O(|P |/|ci|), given that the population
shrinks by |ci| agents as each team is formed and removed.
select one agent pj uniformly at random from within the set.
add agent pj to the coalition tk.
optimize the |ci| × |ci| matrix of agent utilities over the roles in composition ci
by the Kuhn Munkres algorithm.
for |C| compositions c0 → c|C|−1 do
for m positions r0 → rm−1 ∈ ci do
remove agent pj’s vote from the population, decrementing the sum total
vote on 〈ci, rj〉.
end for
end for
end for
append team tk to the partition π.
end for
Observation 5.1.2. The time complexity of greedy voting heuristic is O(|P |2 ·m2).
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5.2 Greedy Local Search Heuristic
In this section, I define a greedy local search heuristic which runs in polynomial time.
I prove that, for a special case of RBHG, this algorithm will always produce a perfect
assignment.
The greedy local search heuristic I introduce for RBHG iteratively selects an agent
p ∈ P as the pivotal agent and locally optimizes either expected utility or expected
stability for the team t including p and some new agent p′ ∈ P . The local search
continues to add agents to the team t until no local improvement is available or all
positions have been filled, at which point t is added to the final partition. A new
pivotal agent is then selected, forming a new team around the pivot. This procedure
is repeated for each of the up to |P |/max(|t|) teams. In this procedure, a pivotal agent
must be selected each iteration. I consider three different methods for selecting the
pivotal agent, which I will detail in Section 5.5. Each of three methods I use allows
for the selection of a pivotal agent to be made in constant time. The pseudocode for
the greedy algorithm follows:
Algorithm 2 GreedyLocalSearch(RBHG instance B, empty partition π)
for (|P |/min(|c|)) teams do
select a pivotal agent p
for max(|c|)− 1 positions do
set max index imax to null
set max score smax to min(up(r, c)) · |P |
for each p′ of the |P |/m remaining agents do
calculate expected utility s′p for t ∪ p′ %O(|C| ·max(|c|)3)
if s′p > smax, set imax = p
′ and smax = s
′
p
end for
set t = t ∪ imax
end for
set π = π ∪ t
end for
Observation 5.2.1. The time complexity of greedy local search heursitic is O(|P |2 ·
|C| ·max(|c|)2).
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5.3 Scraping League of Legends Game Data
For my experiments, I consider a population of League of Legends players where
|P | = 1081. I scraped data from the most recent 20 matches for each player p ∈ P
from the League of Legends game statistics website LolKing [21], maintained by ZAM
Network LLC. I stored the roles, compositions, and win/loss records for each match. I
selected players uniformly at random by generating account numbers from 20,000,000
to 60,000,000. This gives a range of accounts having been created roughly between the
years 2012 and 2014. After generating a number, I checked if the account was active
by checking the dates of the most recent 10 matches. Players whose most recent 10
matches were played within the last 7 days and had a team size of 5 were accepted for
scraping, while others were rejected. Among those accepted, I checked again in 7 days
and scraped for additional match data. I accepted those whose matches continued to
meet my criteria and rejected the rest. This procedure left me with the population
of 1081 players to consider.
I considered a set R with |R| = 5 consisting of popular champion roles, Jungler,
AD Carry, Tank, Support, and Mage. These roles were identified as the most com-
mon roles of champions selected. To handle multiple identical roles within the same
composition, I accumulated a counter to create multiple instances of the same role.
I used frequent item set mining over the sets of roles used each match to determine
the most frequently played compositions within the population. Frequent item set
mining was performed using a recursive elimination implementation by Borgelt [17].
I used a support threshold of 3%; that is, I accepted those compositions which were
used (i.e. supported) in at least 3% of matches, and rejected others. This left a set
|C| = 8 of compositions which in total were used in more than 60% of all matches
played in the games I considered.
In Table 5.1 I show the percentage of winning teams which used each composition
within the support threshold. Table 5.2 presents the percentage of losing teams
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Table 5.1: Percent usage of compositions by winning teams, support threshold ≥ 3%
Composition Percent Usage (%)
J1 S1 T1 M1 A1 (20.3255)
M2 S1 T1 A1 M1 (9.312)
T2 S1 M1 A1 T1 (7.25911)
M2 J1 T1 A1 M1 (6.15868)
M2 J1 S1 A1 M1 (5.61309)
J2 S1 M1 A1 J1 (5.16923)
T2 M2 A1 T1 M1 (3.42149)
T2 J1 M1 A1 T1 (3.32902)
Table 5.2: Percent usage of compositions by losing teams, support threshold ≥ 3%
Composition Percent Usage (%)
J1 S1 T1 M1 A1 (19.2343)
M2 S1 T1 A1 M1 (7.58276)
M2 S1 J1 A1 M1 (6.64879)
M2 J1 T1 A1 M1 (6.50083)
T2 S1 M1 A1 T1 (5.35417)
T2 J1 M1 A1 T1 (4.62364)
J2 S1 M1 A1 J1 (4.2445)
T2 M2 A1 T1 M1 (3.02386)
which used each composition. Roles within compositions are numbered to distinguish
multiple instances of the same role. Table 5.3 presents the percent likelihood that a
given agent will accept one of the five popular roles. The numbering here shows the
likelihood that an agent will accept being the first, second, or even third instance of
the given role within a composition. Notably, it is more likely for a third Mage to
be adopted onto a team than even a second AD Carry, even though the AD Carry
is the most popular role of all. For players familiar with the game, this may not be
surprising as the AD Carry role tends to require more of the limited team resources
in order to do well. As such, having a second or much less third person fulfilling that
role within a team is not common practice. I observe from the data that most people
want to play this position but few people want there to be two of them.
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Table 5.3: Percent usage of roles across all teams, support threshold ≥ 3%
Role Percent Usage (%)
A1 (90.836)
M1 (89.1807)
T1 (76.6969)
S1 (68.2264)
J1 (64.8696)
M2 (41.1873)
T2 (25.7259)
J2 (14.9898)
M3 (9.44146)
S2 (6.82449)
A2 (5.91825)
T3 (4.30923)
5.4 Randomly Generated RBHG Instances
I generated 80 RBHG instances, each with population size |P | = 1081, to compare
with the heuristic result on two instances generated from League of Legends match-
making data. I used the set of eight compositions and five roles from the scraped
League of Legends data. I used four utility distributions, each over 20 of the RBHG
instances: League of Legends based utilities, one popular role, one unpopular role, and
devoted role utilities. Primarily, the question being asked with each experiment is
whether or not the proposed utility distribution produces similar results to the real
world data. Secondarily, I am examining the algorithms’ performances with respect
to expected stability, expected utility, and optimal composition utility with respect to
these distributions.
Utility for each role and composition was set to a default value of 0. For each agent,
10 simulated matches were generated assigning the agent to a role and composition.
Utility for the agent on these roles and compositions was set to 1. For each simulated
match, the random number generator from the Python random library was used to
decide which role and composition to select.
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League of Legends based utilities: A probability distribution over the compositions
and roles was created. When generating a match for an agent, the probabil-
ity of the agent accepting a particular role and composition was equal to the
probability of an agent accepting the same role and composition in the League
of Legends data. The resulting utility distribution is similar to what is ob-
served in the League of Legends matches but does not guarantee a modeling
of individual agent behaviors. The question being asked by this experiment is
whether the population-wide probability distribution over role and composition
pair acceptance is sufficient to predict similar matchmaking results to the real
world data.
One popular role: In each instance, a single role was selected to be most popular to
all agents. This is analogous to the observed preference of League of Legends
players to play the AD Carry (Table 5.3), but taken to an extreme. When
generating a preference for a role and composition pair, the probability of the
agent selecting the popular role was 80%, with each of the other four roles being
selected with 5% probability. The composition for each match was selected
uniformly at random from the set. The question being asked by this experiment
is whether or not having a single role popular to the entire population produces
similar matchmaking results to the real world data.
One unpopular role: In each instance, a single role was selected to be least popular
to all agents. This is analogous to the observed dislike of League of Legends
players to fulfill the role of Support (Table 5.3), again to the extreme. When
generating a preference for a role and composition pair, the probability of the
agent selecting the unpopular role was 5%, with each of the other four roles
being selected with 23.75% probability. The composition for each match was
selected uniformly at random from the set. The question being asked by this
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experiment is whether or not having a single role unpopular to the entire pop-
ulation produces similar matchmaking results to the real world data.
Devoted role: In each instance, for each agent, a single role was selected to be strictly
preferred by that agent. This is analogous to a League of Legends player who is
devoted to selecting a single preferred role whenever possible. When generating
a preference for a role and composition pair in these instances, an agent is always
assigned to its preferred role if it is available in that composition. If the preferred
role is not available in the composition, a role is selected uniformly at random.
The composition for each match was selected uniformly at random from the
set. The question being asked by this experiment is whether or not having each
agent devote themselves to a single role produces similar matchmaking results
to the real world data.
5.5 Testing and Results
As previously observed, optimal composition utility, expected utility and expected sta-
bility can be calculated in polynomial time given a partition π. The challenge is
selecting a partition of agents to teams for which these values are optimized. I evalu-
ate the partitions generated by each algorithm in terms of the maximum, minimum,
mean and median for each of optimal composition utility, expected utility and ex-
pected stability. I consider expected stablity and expected utility both over the number
of reachable compositions and over the number of reachable and advocated composi-
tions.
The choice of pivotal agent for greedy local search heuristic can impact the results
of the algorithm. I considered three methods of selecting a pivotal agent: selecting
an agent who is among the easiest to please, an agent who is among the hardest to
please, and an agent selected uniformly at random.
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Definition 5.5.1. Given an instance B of RBHG, an agent pi who is among the
easiest to please is one for whom qi =
∑
r,c ui(r, c) is maximized. An agent who is
among the hardest to please is one for whom qi is minimized.
I ran greedy local search heuristic upon the entire population |P | = 1081 generated
from the League of Legends game data and on the 20 randomly generated instances.
I tested three variants of Greedy Local Search, varying the method of selecting the
pivotal agent: selecting one of the easiest to please agents each iteration, one of the
hardest to please agents, and an agent selected i.i.d. from P .
I ran greedy voting heuristic upon the same population. In addition, I formed
100 partitions of agents to teams selected i.i.d. This comparison tests how the two
algorithms fare against matchmaking without attempting optimization.
For the League of Legends data I tested two utility functions, wins only and wins
and losses, each generated from the roles and compositions with which agents won or
lost in the game data considered. In both cases, I consider an agent to accept a pair
〈r, c〉 if up(r, c) = 1 and otherwise to reject it.
Definition 5.5.2. Wins only utility function: For each agent p ∈ P , for each c ∈ C
set up(r, c) = 1 if the agent won more matches with 〈r, c〉 than they lost, and up(r, c) =
0 otherwise.
Definition 5.5.3. Wins and losses utility function: For each agent p ∈ P , for each
c ∈ C set up(r, c) = 1 if the agent won more matches with 〈r, c〉 than they lost,
up(r, c) = −1 if the agent lost more matches with 〈r, c〉 than they won, and up(r, c) = 0
otherwise.
Computations were run on a machine using 8 GB of RAM and a 2.50 GHz Intel(R)
Core(TM) i5-3210M CPU. Each algorithm was implemented in Python 3.4.
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5.5.1 Expected Stability Results
Experimental results in terms of expected stability are found in Figures 5.1–5.12. The
column labeled Max denotes the maximum expected stability across all teams in the
partition, while the column labeled Min denotes the minimum across all teams. The
columns labeled Mean and Median denote the mean and median across all teams.
For expected stability the maximum possible value is 1. Note that Figures 5.1, 5.3,
5.5, and 5.9 over reachable compositions use a smaller maximum value for the Y axis
compared to Figures 5.2, 5.4, 5.6, and 5.10. This is due to the smaller magnitudes of
their results.
The greedy voting heuristic shows minor improvement over random partitions with
regards to maximum and mean expected stability for all utility functions. However,
with only one exception (Figure 5.3), the greedy local search heuristic produces higher
expected stability than both random partitions and the greedy voting heuristic. This
result occurs regardless of the selection of pivotal agent each iteration of the local
search. Instances generated from the scrapped League of Legends data had better
results by selecting the hardest to please agent as the pivot, while selecting a random
pivot tends to be the best choice in other instances.
Expected stability was difficult to optimize–especially in terms of the minimum
across all teams. For all approaches, on all six utility functions tested, minimum
expected stability was zero. The same is true of the medians for both the one popular
role (Figures 5.3 and 5.4) and one unpopular role (Figures 5.5 and 5.6) generated
instances. It is possible that there were no possible partitions for these instances
with a higher minimum expected stability. Note that a partition with a minimum
expected stability greater than zero contains a perfect matching, given that each team
has at least one composition with a perfect matching. As previously observed, not
every RBHG instance contains a perfect solution and it is NP-complete to decided if
one exists for a given instance.
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Best results were observed in the devoted role instances (Figures 5.11 and 5.12).
Instances with League of Legends based utilities and those generated directly from
League of Legends matchmaking data showed similar improvement, but not to the
same magnitude (with the exception of a single team maintaining perfect expected
stability even over reachable compositions in Figure 5.7). The solutions for these
instances contained fewer reachable compositions on each team compared to the other
experimental utility functions.
Figure 5.1: Expected stability over
reachable compositions with generated
League of Legends match data using
utility function up(r, c)→ (1, 0)
Figure 5.2: Expected stability over
reachable and advocated composi-
tions with generated League of Leg-
ends match data using utility function
up(r, c)→ (1, 0)
Figure 5.3: Expected stability over
reachable compositions with generated
one popular role match data using util-
ity function up(r, c)→ (1, 0)
Figure 5.4: Expected stability over
reachable and advocated compositions
with generated one popular role match
data using utility function up(r, c) →
(1, 0)
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Figure 5.5: Expected stability over
reachable compositions with generated
one unpopular role match data using
utility function up(r, c)→ (1, 0)
Figure 5.6: Expected stability over
reachable and advocated composi-
tions with generated one unpopular
role match data using utility function
up(r, c)→ (1, 0)
Figure 5.7: Expected Stability over
reachable compositions with League of
Legends match data using utility func-
tion up(r, c)→ (1, 0,−1)
Figure 5.8: Expected Stability over
reachable and advocated composi-
tions with League of Legends match
data using utility function up(r, c) →
(1, 0,−1)
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Figure 5.9: Expected stability over
reachable compositions with League of
Legends match data using utility func-
tion up(r, c)→ (1, 0)
Figure 5.10: Expected stability over
reachable and advocated compositions
with League of Legends match data
using utility function up(r, c)→ (1, 0)
Figure 5.11: Expected stability over
reachable compositions with generated
devoted role match data using utility
function up(r, c)→ (1, 0)
Figure 5.12: Expected stability over
reachable and advocated compositions
with generated devoted role match
data using utility function up(r, c) →
(1, 0)
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5.5.2 Expected Utility Results
Experimental results in terms of expected utility are found in Figures 5.13–5.24. The
column labeled Max denotes the maximum expected utility across all teams in the
partition, while the column labeled Min denotes the minimum across all teams. The
columns labeled Mean and Median denote the mean and median across all teams.
For expected utility the maximum possible value is 5. Note that Figures 5.13, 5.15,
5.17, 5.19, and 5.21 over reachable compositions use a smaller maximum value for
the Y axis compared to Figures 5.12, 5.14, 5.16, 5.18, and 5.20. This is due to the
smaller magnitudes of their results.
The greedy voting heuristic does not demonstrate general improvement over ran-
dom partitions with regards to maximum, mean and median expected utility. For
min expected utility, random partitioning shows an improvement over greedy voting
heuristic.
In one case (Figure 5.23), random partitioning showed improvement over one (but
not all) of the the local search pivot selection methods. Otherwise, the greedy local
search heuristic showed improvement for expected utility over random partitioning
in all cases.
The greedy voting heuristic shows a large improvement over the greedy local search
algorithm in terms of the maximum expected utility over reachable compositions on
instances generated from League of Legends matchmaking data (Figures 5.19 and
5.21) and on instances generated with League of Legends based utility distributions
(Figure 5.13). This is due to fact that, in these instances, the composition consisting
of one of each role is highly popular. Because the greedy voting heuristic is designed
to select a team based upon the most popular composition each iteration, it often
selects a team which optimizes utility on this composition. This tends to lower the
number of reachable compositions, with each agent having a preference for a unique
role in at least this composition. As the improvement does not carry over to the mean
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and median, this does not necessarily suggest a general improvement by the greedy
voting heuristic. Furthermore, the improvements do not hold up when only reachable
and acceptable compositions are considered (Figures 5.14, 5.20, and 5.22).
For the mean and median, no strong improvements of expected utility over reach-
able compositions are observed for either the greedy voting heuristic or the greedy
local search heuristic compared to random partitions. While I observe that the mag-
nitude of results are once again higher overall for the devoted role utility function,
the greedy local search heuristic only tends to improve on expected utility over reach-
able and acceptable compositions. While expected stability over reachable compositions
was improved by the role/-devotion phenomenon, expected utility does not share this
relationship on these instances.
Figure 5.13: Expected utility over
reachable compositions with generated
League of Legends match data using
utility function up(r, c)→ (1, 0)
Figure 5.14: Expected utility over
reachable and advocated composi-
tions with generated League of Leg-
ends match data using utility function
up(r, c)→ (1, 0)
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Figure 5.15: Expected utility over
reachable compositions with generated
one popular role match data using util-
ity function up(r, c)→ (1, 0)
Figure 5.16: Expected utility over
reachable and advocated compositions
with generated one popular role match
data using utility function up(r, c) →
(1, 0)
Figure 5.17: Expected utility over
reachable compositions with generated
one unpopular role match data using
utility function up(r, c)→ (1, 0)
Figure 5.18: Expected utility over
reachable and advocated composi-
tions with generated one unpopular
role match data using utility function
up(r, c)→ (1, 0)
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Figure 5.19: Expected utility over
reachable compositions with League of
Legends match data using utility func-
tion up(r, c)→ (1, 0,−1)
Figure 5.20: Expected utility over
reachable and advocated composi-
tions with League of Legends match
data using utility function up(r, c) →
(1, 0,−1)
Figure 5.21: Expected utility over
reachable compositions with League of
Legends match data using utility func-
tion up(r, c)→ (1, 0)
Figure 5.22: Expected utility over
reachable and advocated compositions
with League of Legends match data
using utility function up(r, c)→ (1, 0)
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Figure 5.23: Expected utility over
reachable compositions with generated
devoted role match data using utility
function up(r, c)→ (1, 0)
Figure 5.24: Expected utility over
reachable and advocated compositions
with generated devoted role match
data using utility function up(r, c) →
(1, 0)
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5.5.3 Optimal Composition Utility Results
Experimental results in terms of optimal composition utility are found in Figures
5.25–5.30. The column labeled Max denotes the maximum optimal composition utility
across all teams in the partition, while the column labeled Min denotes the minimum
across all teams. The columns labeled Mean and Median denote the mean and median
across all teams. For optimal composition utility the maximum possible value is five.
It is worth noting that optimal composition utility is the only metric that the
greedy voting heuristic was designed to improve. Rather than attempting to optimize
over all compositions, the voting heuristic works by selecting a highly preferred com-
position and then matching agents to roles within that composition in an optimal
way. Therefore, I would expect the voting heuristic to perform better on this test
case than on the previous two.
None of the methods seem to have trouble optimizing the maximum optimal com-
position utility among teams. It seems that even with a random partition it is likely to
find at least one team with a perfect matching for each of the five utility distributions
considered.
For the minimum optimal composition utility, the greedy local search heuristic
performs as well as or better than both the greedy voting heuristic and random parti-
tioning on all cases except on the devoted role instances (Figure 5.30). Similarly, with
only one exception (Figure 5.26), the greedy local search heuristic shows improvement
for both the mean and the median on these instances.
Though it is generally beaten by local search, the greedy voting heuristic performs
as well as or better than random partitions in terms of the mean and median. This
is in contrast to the lack of significant improvement seen from the voting heuristic
for expected stability and expected utility. In the case of utility distributions with
one popular role (Figure 5.26) the voting heuristic actually out-performs the local
search heuristic in terms of the mean. While the local search heuristic generally shows
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improvement over the voting heuristic, the difference is less sweeping and pronounced
for the optimal composition utility.
Figure 5.25: Optimal composition utility with generated League of Legends match
data using utility function up(r, c)→ (1, 0)
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Figure 5.26: Optimal composition utility with generated one popular role match data
using utility function up(r, c)→ (1, 0)
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Figure 5.27: Optimal composition utility with generated one unpopular role match
data using utility function up(r, c)→ (1, 0)
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Figure 5.28: Optimal composition utility with League of Legends match data using
utility function up(r, c)→ (1, 0,−1)
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Figure 5.29: Optimal composition utility with League of Legends match data using
utility function up(r, c)→ (1, 0)
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Figure 5.30: Optimal composition utility with generated devoted role match data
using utility function up(r, c)→ (1, 0)
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Chapter 6 Conclusions
6.1 Complexity Results
Given a partition, an optimal matching in terms of optimal composition utility can
be found in polynomial time as shown in Section 2.6. Similarly, expected utility and
expected stability can be evaluated in time polynomial in the RBHG instance; if
the number of compositions is polynomial in the number of players and roles, then
these evaluations will also be polynomial in the number of players and roles. Each
composition can be optimized in cubic time over the team size by the Kuhn Munkres
algorithm for square matrices.
Finding a partition and subsequent matching which is perfect or optimizes max
sum or max min utility is computationally hard as shown in Section 4.1. I observe
that these goal solutions may not be as valuable in a setting where agents can choose
to reject a solution. Finding a partition and matching which is stable under several
measures of stability is also computationally hard as shown in Section 4.2.
6.2 Algorithms and Utility Distributions
When considering the set of reachable and advocated compositions, experiments in
Section 5.5 show that optimizing expected stability may be a difficult goal to achieve
on League of Legends data. It appears that the availability of partitions with a high
expected stability is limited given the two utility functions proposed in this paper.
The results for optimizing expected utility and optimal composition utility are more
promising. By contrast, I discovered stronger results for optimizing expected stability
over the set of reachable compositions. This is particularly pronounced on instances
where each agent exhibits a strong devotion to a particular role, and tends to hold
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up on instances generated from League of Legends matchmaking data and instances
generated with utility distributions based upon this data.
My earliest work on optimization showed good results for the greedy voting heuris-
tic [69]. These results hold up somewhat for optimization of optimal composition
utility, for which the algorithm was originally designed. However, the new algorithm
presented in Section 2.6 for optimizing a matching given a partition allows a random
partitioning algorithm to work almost as well as the greedy voting heuristic, as shown
in Section 5.5.
The greedy local search heuristic out-performs the greedy voting heuristic for all
optimization problems considered in this paper in almost all cases. The greedy local
search heuristic also out-performs random partitioning in almost every case. As such,
the greedy local search heuristic appears to be the best algorithm so far for selecting
a partition.
The greedy local search heuristic can be parallelized both over the set of com-
positions and the set of agents. The step of checking for which agent to next add
to a team can be parallelized by considering agents in parallel. Checking the utility
of the optimal matching for each composition can also be parallelized. The results
of the algorithm would not be changed, given that the agent utilities for roles and
compositions are all independent variables.
6.3 Thoughts on a Utility Functions and a Recommender System
Future work will involve two stages of user testing. First, I will validate the selection of
a utility function which represents true utilities of players for roles and compositions.
Second, I will design, implement and validate recommendation systems on real users
in such role based hedonic game settings as League of Legends.
With a recommendation system, a central authority may recommend a subset of
products, services or objects which agents are most likely to accept out of the larger
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total set of options. Recommendation systems are popular tools in e–commerce [63],
social networks [77], medicine [42], and other fields. Applications include movie and
video recommendations [26, 54], music recommendations [64, 83], and team recom-
mendation systems [22].
For the particular problem of team recommendation in League of Legends and
other role based online video games, I consider the task of recommending roles to
players on a team after a partition has been formed. After leveraging the greedy
local search heuristic to form a partition, the system could recommend optimal role
assignments to agents within their teams in polynomial time. Should the agents
accept these recommendations, the experiments suggest high max, mean, and median
optimal composition utilities can be achieved.
The challenges include making recommendations which adapt to changing pref-
erences and avoiding recommendations to users who either reject the system or are
too unpredictable. A successful recommendation system will improve the acceptance
rate for optimal composition matchings while not otherwise creating a negative ex-
perience. A successful system should also protect itself from possible “trolling” or
rejection of the system itself, where a user might consistently act against the recom-
mendations provided. Finally, the system should be able to distinguish between a
user actively working against the recommendation system and a user who experiences
a major shift in preferences.
I propose a two phase recommendation system. Phase one involves pure learn-
ing without recommendation, while phase two incorporates recommendations while
continuing to observe changes in user preferences.
Users start in phase one, where they are given no recommendations. The system
observes behavior and begins determining user preferences for roles and compositions.
Once a user’s preferences become sufficiently predictable, that user is moved to phase
two. In phase two, users are provided recommendations. The system continues to
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observe behavior both in terms of user preferences and in terms of acceptance of
recommendations. Recommendations will be offered privately to users so that other
users do not observe whether or not they accept or reject the recommendations. If a
user consistently rejects recommendations, I would expect it to be due to a change in
preferences or a rejection of the recommendation system. After a certain threshold
of rejections has been reached, a user will be moved back to phase one for additional
observation without recommendation. A user who must be moved back to phase
one frequently may be kept in phase one for longer periods of time. A user who
consistently accepts recommendations in phase two would, alternatively, be kept in
phase two.
Users whose preferences experience a significant paradigm shift may move to phase
one for a period of time until the recommendation system learns their new prefer-
ences, then back to phase two once they are well understood. This would allow the
recommendation system to distinguish between changing preferences and behavior
which is either highly unpredictable or designed to work against the recommendation
system. In this way, users would “opt in” to the recommendation system by gener-
ally accepting what it recommends, and “opt out” by ignoring it or actively working
against it. Users whose preferences are highly unpredictable are not a good fit for
recommendations from the system and would be naturally kept in phase one until
such time that their preferences become predictable.
Copyright c© Matthew Spradling, 2015.
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[83] Yuan Cao Zhang, Diarmuid Ó Séaghdha, Daniele Quercia, and Tamas Jambor.
Auralist: introducing serendipity into music recommendation. In Proceedings of
the Fifth ACM International Conference on Web Search and Data Mning, pages
13–22. ACM, 2012.
[84] Michael Zuckerman, Ariel D. Procaccia, and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein. Algorithms
for the coalitional manipulation problem. In Proceedings of the Nineteenth An-
nual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pages 277–286. Society for
Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 2008.
79
Vita
Born Matthew Jordan Spradling in Mount Sterling, Kentucky.
Education
Ph. D. Computer Science (Pursuant) University of Kentucky August 2015
B. S. Computer Science University of Kentucky May 2010
B. S. Business Administration University of Louisville Dec 2005
Minor in Philosophy
Professional Positions
University of Kentucky Department of Computer Science
• Research Assistant, 2013-2015
• Teaching Assistant, 2009-2014
Scholastic and Professional Honors
• Verizon fellowship, University of Kentucky Department of Computer Science,
2015.
• Nominated, University of Kentucky Association for Computing Machinery Out-
standing Teaching Assistant Award, 2014.
• Graduate Certificate in College Teaching and Learning, University of Kentucky
Graduate School, 2014.
• Duncan E. Clarke Memorial Innovation Award, University of Kentucky Depart-
ment of Computer Science, 2013.
Professional Publications
• Spradling, M., Goldsmith, J., Stability in Role Based Hedonic Games, 28th
International Florida Artificial Intelligence Research Society Conference, 2015.
• Spradling, M., Roles and Teams Hedonic Games, 19th AAAI Doctoral Consor-
tium, 2014.
• Spradling, M., Goldsmith, J., Liu, X., Dadi, C., & Li, Z. Roles and Teams
Hedonic Game, 3rd International Conference on Algorithmic Decision Theory,
2013.
Also presented without proceedings at 7th Multidisciplinary Workshop on Ad-
vances in Preference Handling at IJCAI’13, 2013.
80
